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Abstract
This paper assesses the effectiveness of various ranked-choice voting systems, as
compared to the current plurality system, in reflecting aggregate voter preferences in
United States presidential primary elections. Survey data, gathered in February 2020
by FairVote, elicited the ranked preferences of a random sample of likely Democratic
primary voters for eight remaining candidates in the election at that point. I use
these data to estimate a model of voter preferences and to simulate various election
outcomes, including a simple plurality election and various types of ranked-choice elec-
tions. Voter preferences, which are analyzed using a multinomial logit choice model,
inform the social welfare for the voting population that each candidate provides. Using
these estimates of social welfare for each candidate, I assess how each ranked-choice
election system compares to the current plurality system and which systems best reflect
aggregate voter preferences. I also evaluate each system on the basis of various desir-
able criteria for practical application. I find that certain RCV mechanisms provide,
in some instances, higher social utility for the voting population and that they meet
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1 Introduction and Motivation
Electoral reform is a controversial topic in the United States, especially for presidential elec-
tions, as voters, politicians, and political scientists express frustration with the country’s
primary and general election voting systems. Electoral mechanisms, such as the electoral
college and delegate allocation, were historically put in place to prevent a “tyranny of the
majority” and to provide adequate political representation to smaller populations, but such
mechanisms are increasingly viewed as skewing election outcomes (Goldberg, 2017). Calls
for reform have increased with heightened polarization, and organizations have taken to an-
alyzing the effect of “spoiler” candidates on election outcomes in existing voting systems
(“Polarization”, 2020). Though it is not clear how outcomes would have changed with the
absence of Jill Stein from the 2016 presidential election, Ralph Nader from the 2000 presiden-
tial election, or Ross Perot from the 1992 presidential election, discourse by academics and
reform organizations often considers the suggestion that ranked-choice voting (RCV) would
have been able to correct for these “spoiler” candidates (Kambhampaty, 2019; “Ranked
Choice Voting In Presidential Campaigns”, 2020; Tabarrok, 2001; Foley, 2019). RCV allows
voters to rank every candidate in one ballot in order of preference, in one trip to the polls
or in one absentee form, rather than only having to choose one candidate per office as is
required by current ballots.
Though RCV has most frequently been proposed in response to general election outcomes,
this thesis is concerned with assessing the implications of RCV in U.S. presidential primary
elections. RCV has been highly debated for the implications it has on vote allocation in
a two-party system, as it provides more incentives for voters to select candidates whom
they would not otherwise deem viable; similarly, RCV could also alter voting incentives in
primary elections, especially since primaries provide more options for voters to choose from
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than do general elections. This thesis determines if RCV systems allow parties to nominate
candidates who better reflect the preferences of all of their voters than does a plurality
system, especially valuable as parties have an increasing number of candidates competing
each cycle. The 2020 Democratic primary elections, conducted from February to August, saw
a record number of candidates competing for the party nomination; twenty-nine candidates
declared their intentions to run and, ultimately, eleven remained in the race by the start of
the first primary events, the Iowa caucuses. Many candidates withdrew from the race as it
became increasingly clear (through media and polling) that the election would come down
to a two-person contest between Joe Biden and Bernie Sanders.
The other nine candidates who were still in the election at the start of primaries withdrew
at various times from mid-February to mid-March after assessing their performance in early
elections. Many voters in early elections expressed frustrations about having voted for a
candidate who did not remain in the race much longer. For example, Pete Buttigieg had
received tens of thousands of votes and over 20 pledged delegates during February primary
elections, only to drop out of the race before Super Tuesday on March 3rd (Coltrain, 2020).
Other voters had cast their ballots strategically to avoid voting for candidates whom they did
not foresee remaining in the race. For example, some avoided voting for Michael Bloomberg
or Elizabeth Warren, despite them both remaining in the race past Super Tuesday, because
the winner, by that point, would likely be either Joe Biden or Bernie Sanders. Both of
these trends skew election outcomes because they incentivize voters to misrepresent their
preferences. RCV is touted for providing a potential solution to such concerns (Risch, 2020).
Rational primary voters cast their ballots in a manner which they think will lead them to
the best possible president in office for their desired outcomes, whether that be descriptive
representation or passage of favorable policies. This could entail voters selecting whichever
candidate aligns most with their preferences, demographics, or stances, or they might select
the candidate who they believe is best positioned for competition in the general election.
Regardless of the different factors that determine voter preferences, voting systems are used
4
1 INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
to select the best outcome for the overall voting population using only voters’ ballots as an
input.
There are a few main questions considered in this thesis. Firstly, do the various election
systems—simple plurality, similar to our current system, and ranked-choice methods—truly
yield different outcomes? If they do yield differences in outcome, is this consequential for
social utility? Additionally, do these various election systems otherwise differ, perhaps in
their effects on voting procedure or in their practical applications? In economics, these ques-
tions are best considered in the context of previous game theory and social choice research.
This thesis uses existing literature in these research areas to determine bases on which to
evaluate the voting systems considered; my paper, however, stands unique in considering
ranked preferences that are used to select a single candidate winner.
I use survey data to simulate outcomes of various voting systems on the 2020 U.S. Demo-
cratic Party presidential primary election. The voting systems considered include variations
of runoff, Borda Count, and Condorcet mechanisms. Using a model of voter preferences
based on ideology and other demographic characteristics, I estimate the overall utility pro-
vided by each candidate in the race. I use these utility measures to determine how each
voting system impacts social utility for the voting population to contribute to my assess-
ment of the benefits and drawbacks of each system. It would be highly consequential to our
democracy to determine which system best reflects voter preferences and best incentivizes
truthful revelation. This would not only encourage voter turnout, but would also encourage
potential candidates to compete in elections, especially as increased trends of polarization





The presidential primary nomination process is not set in the United States Constitution,
so it is flexible and has evolved over the years. The current primary election system is, on
its face, a simple plurality election where the candidate with the most votes wins; however,
there are many complicated facets to the process, notably regarding the staggered timing
and locations of elections and regarding convention delegates. Historically, party nominees
were internally selected by party leadership, but nominee selection has since come to occur at
a national convention, which is seen as more democratic and transparent. Reformers pushed
to expand primary elections to state voters to measure public opinion of candidates, and
primary elections currently play this same role in party nominations (Yglesias, 2016). In
these primary elections or caucuses, voters either go to a polling place or to an event hosted
by the state party to cast a ballot or otherwise express preference for one single candidate
among the competing slate.
The varied timing of each state’s primaries has stirred a lot of discussion over the years
(“‘Front-loading’ the Primaries”, 2004). Certain states whose primaries are held earlier in
the cycle are significantly more influential in swaying election outcomes, especially as primary
elections come to be decided more often before the end of the primary election season. New
Hampshire had long held the title of “first-in-the-nation” to vote in primaries and, noticing
the level of influence that they had, other states have tried to move up their primaries to
have similar influence (Yglesias, 2016). In 2016, however, parties ruled that primaries cannot
occur before February of election year, and that only Iowa, New Hampshire, Nevada, and
South Carolina can have primaries in that month. Thus, candidates spend their time in
early months campaigning in these critical states, a trend called “front-loading.”
Critics note that front-loading is problematic as it gives incredible power to states with
smaller populations since media and agency pollsters can quickly transmit information about
how candidates are performing or are projected to be performing across states (“‘Front-
loading’ the Primaries”, 2004). They note that states with larger populations, and that
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are in considerably different geographic regions, have to vote last, often after the election
is already decided (Yglesias, 2016). One notable example is California, which is among the
last to vote, like other Western states, despite having a very large population. States have
attempted to lean into the geographic clustering of elections by creating geographic blocs—
like Super Tuesday, which started out as a bloc for Southern states—to encourage candidates
to spend campaign time in certain regions (Yglesias, 2016). Timing of various elections is
especially consequential as candidates drop out in between primaries if they are not signaling
early strength; in later sections, I discuss how election systems vary in considering votes if
candidates drop out mid-season.
Additionally, an often misunderstood aspect of U.S. presidential primary elections is the
role of delegates. The party chooses how many delegates are allocated to each state. State
parties choose to hold either primary elections, run by the state and local governments, or
caucuses, run by the state party, to determine how delegates will vote at the party’s national
convention. Delegates are often “pledged” based on the proportion of votes received by each
candidate in the state or district. It is notable that the candidate who is the plurality winner
in the state, but might not be the majority winner, receives the pledges of the largest portion
of that state’s delegates. Additionally, each party also has some “unpledged” delegates who
are not bound to vote in alignment with any election result. In the Democratic party, there
are a significant number of these delegates, called “superdelegates,” whose roles are hotly
debated for the amount of influence they have on party nominee selection. Once the national
convention begins, delegates cast their first round of votes and a candidate is selected only
if they achieve an absolute majority of votes. If this does not happen, it is considered to be
a “brokered convention” and delegates are “released.” They are then allowed to reconsider
their votes in subsequent rounds until one candidate finally attains an absolute majority of
votes (Yglesias, 2016). I assess, through my evaluation of various RCV systems, how ranked
ballots could help inform delegates in their voting process.
Both for presidential primaries and in other elections, some states have begun to imple-
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ment ranked-choice voting systems. For the 2020 presidential primaries, Nevada, Alaska,
Wyoming, Kansas, and Hawaii used forms of RCV (Risch, 2020). The latter four states
had very late primaries, all in April to May, after every candidate except Joe Biden had al-
ready dropped out. Nevada held an early primary in February; however, the option of RCV
was only available to early voters. All five states saw increases in voter turnout; though
not necessarily caused by RCV, the new voting systems were not shown to have negatively
impacted turnout. One state has gained national attention for its use of ranked-choice vot-
ing in other elections: Maine. Vote counts from a notable election in Maine are publicly
available and I, in the later Data section of this thesis, explain why I chose not to use this
data set. Despite this, RCV has had considerable impacts on election outcomes in Maine,
and the state has been praised for its successful implementation (“Spotlight: Maine”, 2020).
RCV has otherwise been used in many local elections throughout the country, often to assess
if and how it would work at higher levels (“Data on Ranked Choice Voting”, 2020). The
RCV election types implemented in these states are usually either instant-runoff elections or
single-elimination runoff elections, where the least popular candidate is eliminated one at a
time.
In addition to these two runoff mechanisms, this thesis also considers two commonly-
discussed types of ranked-choice elections in game theory: Borda count and Condorcet
elections. Both are explained in detail in further sections; but, in brief, Borda count as-
signs a number of points to each candidate based on their position in a voter’s ranking, and
Condorcet methods consider the outcomes of each possible head-to-head face-off between
candidates. Borda count has been used in variations in many countries in Europe and has
also been used at universities in the U.S. for student government and department officer
elections. Its variations have also been used in multi-winner elections (“Ranked Choice Vot-
ing 101”, 2020). The Condorcet method is not known to have been used in any government




In a later section, I expand upon why these election types were selected for consideration,
as well as on some of their costs and implications when applied in practice.
3 Literature Review
3.1 Desirable qualities of voting methods
Literature concerning social choice and aggregate voter preferences helps to determine which
election systems are worth evaluating and what their benefits and drawbacks might be.
Firstly, Kenneth Arrow’s seminal work in social choice articulates criteria to be met for
a satisfactory election system. Arrow (1950) attempts to address the question of finding
a method, other than a well-known “paradox of voting,” that aggregates individual tastes
while implying rational behavior on the part of the community and while considering ordered
preferences (that are complete and transitive), rather than cardinal ones. Arrow concludes
if there are at least three candidates for members of society to choose from, then every
social welfare function (a function mapping multiple individual orderings to one societal
ordering) satisfying his conditions would yield a social ordering that violates one of two
desirable properties: being “non-imposed” and being “non-dictatorial.” This is to say that
every global societal preference order would either not be achievable given the individual
preference orders, making it imposed, or would merely follow the choice preferences of one
individual while disregarding the preferences of all others, making it dictatorial. This paper
and Arrow’s other works have been greatly consequential in choice theory for articulating
desirable properties to look for in various social choice mechanisms. While Arrow’s argu-
ment is that a full societal ranking of candidates cannot be satisfactorily determined given
individual rankings, this thesis explores if one can satisfactorily select a single most-preferred
candidate from aggregate preferences (particularly in a way that is more reflective of voter
preferences than our current method in the United States).
Similarly, Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975) question the plausibility of “strategy-
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proofness” in various voting systems, where voters attempt to secure their desired outcome
by misrepresenting their preferences. Gibbard set out to verify the conjecture that no non-
dictatorial system of voting with at least three possible outcomes can preclude strategic
voting. He proved that every such straightforward game with at least three possible outcomes
violates the condition of non-dictatorship. Satterthwaite develops on Gibbard’s paper, as
Gibbard did not make a direct connection between strategy-proofing and Arrow’s desirable
properties; he questions whether a strategy-proof voting procedure can be constructed to
remove incentives for committee members to use a sophisticated strategy. Satterthwaite finds
a negative conclusion: if the committee is voting on at least three alternatives, every strategy-
proof procedure is dictatorial, as it gives one committee member absolute power over the
choice outcome. He also finds that a one-to-one correspondence exists between strategy-proof
voting procedures and social welfare functions satisfying Arrow’s four conditions. Together,
this literature has formed the “Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem,” suggesting that for all
voting rules, the rule is either dictatorial, only limited to two possible outcomes, or subject
to tactical voting. It is important to assess how each ranked-choice system simulated in my
paper affects the incentives that voters face and how subject they are to tactical voting.
3.2 Using logit models to estimate voter preferences
My use of a multinomial logit model in estimating voter preferences is greatly informed
by Dow and Endersby (2004). They present a theoretically appropriate model of voting
behavior based on utility maximization that serves as a basis for this thesis in developing
a model of voter preferences. Dow and Endersby differentiate the multinomial logit (MNL)
from binary logit/probit, ordered logit/probit, and multinomial probit (MNP) models and
characterize voter choice as a decision among unordered alternatives (parties or candidates)
as a function of chooser (voter) and choice (party/candidate) attributes. They assert that the
MNL model performs as well as or better than MNP, being simpler to optimize and more
often converging at a global optimum, predicting similar percentages of the observations
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but finding more parameters to be statistically significant, and estimating parameters with
smaller confidence bands. The MNL centers on the independence of irrelevant alternatives
(IIA) property, which states that, when considering an individual’s ranking for a subset of
specific alternatives, changes in that individual’s rankings of any “irrelevant” alternatives
should not impact the relative ranking of the “relevant” subset of options. Though there
exists a debate on whether this is too restrictive in the multinomial logit model, the authors
state that IIA should not be viewed as too restrictive on voter preferences as it should be
considered as a desirable logical property rather than as a statistical one. For these reasons,
and since the model, according to the authors’ assertions, works well with smaller data
sample sizes than are needed for MNP, the multinomial logit model is promising for my data
and for my research question.
Other academics, in fields from political science to econometrics, have used logit models
to estimate voter preferences in papers that similarly inform this thesis. Kamakura, Mazzon,
and De Bryun (2006) develop a model based on the classic spatial theory of voting where
voters make choices based on their perceptions of the candidates’ positions as compared to
their own. They develop a nested logit factor model of voter choice to predict future outcomes
in multi-stage elections. They conclude that candidate strategy before a second round of an
election can be guided using demographic data and by identifying positioning of candidates
on latent dimensions on which candidates compete. This thesis similarly assesses the effect
of voters’ demographic data and ideological positioning on preferences for candidates. This
paper also considers cannibalization of votes among similar candidates in elections, which is
often thought to be a large problem with our current majoritarian voting system that might
be reduced with ranked-choice voting. My work is distinctive from this paper in that the
authors are primarily concerned with multi-stage elections where voters must return to the
ballot booth, whereas, in my model, all rankings are gathered at the same time, and the
thesis considers single-stage ranked-ballot elections.
Koop and Poirier (1994) also use a multimonial logit framework and specifically consider
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rank-ordered elections. They conduct a Bayesian investigation of multinominal logit models
on rank-ordered elections, to further develop on their previous research of first-preference
elections, and they test to see if these rank-ordered elections meet the independence of
irrelevant alternatives assumption. Koop and Poirier conclude that voter preferences are
determined in part by an individual’s demographic, work-related, income, and socioeconomic
characteristics. In my analysis, I also consider the effect of such characteristics on voter
preferences. This research presents an applied example of how a MNL framework can be
developed to reflect voter preferences based on demographic characteristics in, specifically,
rank-ordered elections, as is directly relevant to this thesis.
Finally, Scarpa and Thiene (2005) use a multinomial logit model and a latent-class ap-
proach to estimate preferences for various rock-climbing destinations in the Italian Alps based
on demographic characteristics of surveyed rock-climbers. They use the observed choices of
individual rock-climbers to derive conditional estimates of welfare measures for the overall
population. This helps extend my multinomial logit model to look at change in consumer
surplus, helping determine the social welfare of electing certain candidates over others.
This thesis draws upon existing literature to develop my model of voter preferences, to
determine how to estimate social welfare of various candidates based on these preferences,
and to determine various properties that a desirable voting system should meet. My paper
stands unique among existing literature as it specifically focuses on ranked, ordered voter
preferences to select one single most-preferred candidate in single-stage elections.
4 Theoretical Model
This section explores the factors influencing a person’s decision to vote for a candidate,
whether that be casting a single ballot for them as their most-preferred choice or ranking
them in a choice profile among other candidates. I clarify who might vote in a primary
election; identify factors that influence a voter’s utility for each competing candidate; and
12
4 THEORETICAL MODEL 4.1 Setting
elaborate on how voters might embrace different frameworks to maximize their utilities
before casting ballots, depending on how they view candidate ideologies. Finally, I explain
how voters might attempt to strategically vote based off their perceptions of other voters’
actions. This theoretical model allows us to develop an empirical model in later sections
that determines the overall utilities of each candidate for a population of voters.
4.1 Setting
In the United States, citizens who are eligible to vote make the decision of whether or not to
participate in elections based on their “political efficacy.” This entails their internal efficacy,
the belief that one has enough understanding of politics and policy to participate, and their
external efficacy, the belief that one can influence government by their actions (“Perceptions
of the public’s voice,” 2015). If an eligible person’s political efficacy is sufficiently high, their
marginal benefits of voting (i.e. possible positive outcomes of their votes) outweigh their
marginal costs of doing so (i.e. time spent researching candidates and casting a ballot), and
the person will register to vote and possibly affiliate with a political party. Partisan affiliation
can be determined by numerous environmental influences (family, religious affiliations, etc.)
and might often vary from a person’s individual ideological identification. Since voters have
various levels of attachment to a certain party, the choice to officially register with a partisan
affiliation might be determined by the primary election regulations that exist in a voter’s
home state.
In closed-primary states (nine of them), party primaries are only open to voters who have
registered with that party. In open-primary states (fifteen of them), any voter may vote in a
party’s primary without choosing to affiliate with them, enabling voters to cross party lines.
Nine states hold primaries as being open-to-unaffiliated-voters, where unaffiliated voters can
choose to participate in any party’s primary, and the remainder of the states fall in between
these open and closed regulations dependent on the wishes of state party leaders (“State
Primary Election Types”, 2021).
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Enabled by the complexity of primary registrations, there are instances where a voter
might want to vote in the primary opposite from their own party to elect a candidate that
will be easily defeated in the general election. For the purposes of this thesis, let us assume
that a voter in a party primary is not voting to set the party up for weakness. In other words,
I am assuming that voters participating in the party primary intend to vote for whichever
candidate they select in the party primary in the general election, if that candidate becomes
the party nominee. Though I am imposing this assumption, it still leaves room for unaffiliated
or oppositely-affiliated voters to participate in party primaries.
Once a voter has made the decision to participate in a party primary, there are numerous
factors that can influence a voter’s favor for a candidate. There are demographic character-
istics DV which people use to describe or identify themselves, including gender, age, race,
sexuality, socioeconomic status, or regional location. These characteristics could also in-
clude choices such as career, union affiliation, and veteran/military status. Similarly, each
candidate has the aforementioned demographic characteristics DC that are either explicitly
stated or implicitly perceived by voters. There are also desired traits T that a voter might
want a candidate to have: years and type of previous experience, appearance, oration, and
the often-debated “electability” trait. Additionally, many people vote based on key-issue
topics K including, but not limited to, climate change, abortion, or gun legislation. Finally,
a voter’s favor for a candidate can depend on the ideology of the voter themselves IV , and
that of the candidate IC .
Upon identifying these characteristics that affect voter preferences, we can suggest that
utility of a candidate for a voter is dependent on demographic characteristics, D; candidate
traits, T ; key-issue topics, K; and ideology I. Note that costs of voting (i.e. time spent
researching candidates and casting ballots) are not included in the following equation since
these costs are the same across candidates, and since voters are assessing candidate utilities
separately than they are assessing the decision of whether or not to participate in an election.
The utility of candidate C for voter V is
14
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UC,V = f(DV , DC , T,K, IC , IV ).
Once a voter assesses their utility for each candidate, they vote for the candidate who
provides them the most utility or, if they are able to rank candidates, do so in the order of the
utility each candidate provides. To each individual voter, each independent variable holds
a weight, βV , which can be either positive or negative based on the numerous values these
variables can have. For example, candidate traits, T , could include a candidate being highly
experienced. Voters could view ample previous experience as being a positive or negative
thing, and this quality could either be very important in selecting a candidate or barely a
point of consideration. Including these independent variable weights, we can consider the
utility of candidate C for voter V as
UC,V = β1V (DV ) + β2V (DC) + β3V (T ) + β4V (K) + β5V (IC) + β6V (IV ).
Since the role of ideology in voter utility is of particular interest to this thesis, I expand
further on how it can be factored into primary voters’ decisions. There are two different ways
voters might take the ideology of each candidate into consideration: they might examine it
in proximity to the voter’s own ideology or consider the candidate’s ideology by itself.
4.2 Ideology as a determinant of voter preferences
To ideologically characterize candidates and voters, one of two commonly discussed frame-
works of ideology are used in the United States. Most commonly, people are described as
existing at a point on a left-right continuum, introduced by Downs (1957), where “the left”
favor more state-planned economies and “the right” favor more deregulated ones. How-
ever, this axis has come to encompass American social thought as well, and “the left” are
considered to be more liberal overall, and “the right” are considered to be more conserva-
tive overall. The second framework considers the left-right continuum to be a non-nuanced
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view of ideology and instead views ideology as being on a political compass that considers
two-dimensions: an economic axis (left-right) and a social axis (authoritarian-libertarian).
Voters might assess the distance of each candidate’s ideology from their own. We could
consider that a voter has higher utility for a candidate when they are “closer” in distance to
that voter’s ideology. Thus, they will attempt to minimize the distance |IC − IV |. This is
similar to how Black (1948) examined voter behavior in the median voter theorem, in which
he assumed that each voter would rank candidates in order of preference corresponding to
how “close” they are to the voter. This would suggest that a voter is more likely to first-prefer
a candidate who is ideologically similar to them.
However, voters might, instead, take a different strategy in weighing a candidate’s ideol-
ogy. Given that the purpose of primary elections is to select candidates who will compete
against the opposing party’s nominee, a voter might put large stock into which candidate will
perform best in the general election if they perceive the quality of the presumptive nominee
of the opposing party to be particularly low. Large debate exists about the “electability” of
various candidates, as the term is ill-defined and simply reflects various predictions about
what will fare best. In this theoretical model, this notion of “electability” could be included
in the desirable traits of candidates, T . Voters who are more concerned about a potential
party nominee performing better in the general election (due to unique hatred for the pre-
sumptive nominee of the opposing party or for other reasons) might have a stronger weight
for this term T .
Additionally, political science and public choice theory have noted that it is prudent
for candidates to play to the extreme of their parties during primary elections to secure
the nomination, and then move toward the center of the political axis during the general
election to form a majority coalition and win over moderate voters. However, polling shows
that when voters are asked who they would want to make president with a “magic wand,”
their preferences for a candidate vary significantly compared to who they are likely to vote
for in the current electoral system, often actually voting for more moderate candidates than
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they would truly prefer (White, 2020). Since this differs from what political science has
observed in the past, this might imply that “electability” is swaying how primary voters
consider candidate ideology as a factor. For instance, an extreme voter (who would have
made an extreme candidate president with a “magic wand”) might, in reality, vote for a
more moderate candidate (despite a large ideology distance) because they think they will
fare better in the general election. Voters might, thus, have varying utilities for different
candidate ideologies independent of their own ideologies or the distance between the two,
based, rather, on which candidate’s ideology they believe will help defeat a general election
opponent. Voters like this do not necessarily attempt to minimize the distance |IC − IV |
and, rather, ideological distance might be less determinant of candidate utility for such voters
than IC itself.
4.3 Strategies: predicting other voters’ votes
As is evident in the previous subsections, many of the considerations voters take in deter-
mining their candidate preferences involve predicting how other voters will vote. Voters have
to predict who primary voters in the opposing party will elect and, then, depending on the
candidates other primary voters are most likely to select, choose between them to have an
impactful vote. Especially in a large field of candidates, voters rely heavily on pre-election
and mid-election polling to assess which candidates are most popular.
Media and political polling have large influences on voter strategy in U.S. presidential
primary elections. If there are more than two candidates competing in a primary election,
polling, which is easily and widely available to voters, elucidates the top two candidates in
the race before many have cast their ballots. This greatly reduces the incentive for voters to
cast single-choice ballots for any candidate other than these top two, out of fear of a “wasted
ballot.” Thus, after polling and early voting results, voters strategically make their votes
matter by preemptively narrowing the competition and choosing among the most likely to
win the primary, or the most “electable”, still taking into consideration all of the traits and
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demographics as they otherwise would. In a ranked-choice ballot, this one consideration is
eliminated, dependent on which voting regime is used to tally votes, as the full ballot is
considered even if the voter’s top preference is not one of the “top two” candidates. Voters
can rank candidates how they would like and, if they happen to first-prefer a candidate
who is not viable or who ends up dropping out of the race, the method would instruct
ballot-counters to move further down the voter’s list of preferences.
As typical of strategies in non-cooperative game theory, voters are considering other
voters’ behavior, as well as their own preferences, before making a move. For example,
in plurality systems where voters can only select one candidate, voters might strategically
select between the two most popular candidates at the time. Taking other voter behaviors
into consideration impacts not the voter’s own preferences for each candidate but, rather,
how they will act upon their preferences when casting ballots. Further in this thesis, when
considering the merits of each election system as related to certain desirable criteria, I explore
strategies voters can or need not pursue in each different systems.
5 Data
Survey Data This thesis uses survey data both to simulate various election outcomes and
to develop the model estimating voter preferences. The organization FairVote, a nonpar-
tisan organization dedicated to electoral reform and a proponent of ranked-choice voting,
commissioned a survey in February 2020 through SurveyUSA. This poll took a random sam-
ple of voters throughout the United States. The electronic survey determined if each voter
was likely to vote in the upcoming Democratic party primaries through the initial ques-
tions. Then, it gave all “likely Democratic primary voters” (LDPVs) the option to rank
their preferences of the eight remaining 2020 Democratic presidential primary candidates at
the time: Joe Biden, Michael Bloomberg, Pete Buttigieg, Tulsi Gabbard, Amy Klobuchar,
Bernie Sanders, Tom Steyer, and Elizabeth Warren. LDPVs ranked one choice at a time,
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with the options being the eight aforementioned candidates, minus any candidate selected in
a previous choice, plus an “undecided” option. Once a respondent selected “undecided” or
ranked seven preferences, the survey redirected to demographic questions before completing
the survey. All respondents, including those who were not LDPVs, answered the demo-
graphic questions. This survey was set up in such a way that no respondent could indicate
preference for any candidate multiple times (thereby disabling circular preferences), but still
allowed them the freedom to not submit a complete choice profile.
Maine 2018 Election Data I also considered real votes from implemented ranked-choice
elections to determine which type of data is most suitable my research questions. Maine
implemented ranked-choice voting in the 2018 election for their 2nd Congressional District,
and vote counts are readily available through the Maine Secretary of State. In this ranked-
choice election, Democrat Jared Golden defeated Republican incumbent Bruce Poliquin in
the instant runoff, though Poliquin had been leading when votes were still being allocated
to two Independent Party candidates. This contest is a great example of how ranked-choice
systems can change election outcomes. However, though the FairVote data is survey data
rather than real votes, it, unlike the Maine data, provides the opportunity to explore the
effects of RCV on elections with a large number of candidates and also includes demographic
data that directly correspond to each rank profile. Additionally, the Maine ballots were
set up in such a way that many voters indicated circular preferences and attempted to
strategically vote for candidates multiple times. The ballot is pictured in Figure 1, and
it shows a table where all four candidates plus a “write-in” option were listed down the
rows and 1st-5th choices were listed across the columns. Voters simply had to fill in the
bubbles corresponding to their preferences. Out of the 300,287 voters who participated
in this election, 26,964 voters (∼9% of total number of participants) have errors in their
ballots; 12,625 voters ranked the same candidate in multiple slots, creating either cyclical
or otherwise erroneous preferences; and 14,575 voters skipped slots in their rankings, also
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possibly indicating erroneous preferences (though this can be remedied by simply moving
later preferences up to fill the skipped rank). This data teaches us a lot about voter behavior
in ranked-choice ballots; if RCV is to be implemented, election officials would benefit from
attempting to set up ballots in a manner that reflects how SurveyUSA conducted the FairVote
survey, where repeated or skipped preferences are avoided since voters can only vote for each
candidate once. Given that the FairVote survey prevented such erroneous votes and also
acquired demographic data, it is better suited to the empirical model of voter preferences in
this thesis than is the Maine election data.
Figure 1: Sample of Maine’s 2018 Ranked-Choice Ballot for ME-02 Congressional Race
Information Gathered from FairVote Data FairVote gave me their raw data of all
respondents’ full choice profiles. Respondents provided information about the following de-
mographics: gender, age, race, ideology, party affiliation, 2016 presidential vote, educational
attainment, income, marital status, child status, religious affiliation, regional description,
evangelism, union membership, military affiliation, LGBTQ household, and zip code. Re-
spondents indicated qualitative demographics by selecting one of the provided options; for
example, respondents categorized their ideological beliefs as being very conservative, conser-
vative, moderate, liberal, very liberal, or stated that they were not sure. There were 2,868
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total respondents to the survey, and we do not have information about how many people
were contacted to participate. Of this total, only the LDPVs were shown the questions to
rank candidates; there were 954 voters who denoted a preference for at least one candidate.
Key summary statistics of demographic compositions of survey respondents are presented in
Table 1. SurveyUSA also assigned each respondent a demographic weight.
Of the 954 LDPVs who were able to rank preferences, the first-choice preferences were
as follows: 291 votes for Bernie Sanders, 191 for Joe Biden, 177 for Michael Bloomberg, 89
for Pete Buttigieg, 86 for Elizabeth Warren, 45 for Amy Klobuchar, 16 for Tulsi Gabbard,
19 for Tom Steyer, and 40 people were undecided. The number of votes for each candidate
in each other preference slot are shown in Table 2.
Thus, in the FairVote data, the percentage of voters first-preferring each candidate are the
following: Bernie Sanders, 31%; Joe Biden, 20%; Michael Bloomberg, 19%; Pete Buttigieg,
9%; Elizabeth Warren, 9%; Amy Klobuchar, 5%; Tom Steyer, 2%; Tulsi Gabbard, 2%;
and Undecided, 4%. SurveyUSA also conducted a separate poll of United States voters
around the same dates—February 13th, 2020 through February 17th, 2020— to assess who
people were most likely to vote for. The results stand as follows: Bernie Sanders, 29%;
Michael Bloomberg, 18%; Joe Biden, 18%; Pete Buttigieg, 12%; Elizabeth Warren, 10%;
Amy Klobuchar, 4%; and Tom Steyer, 2% (Rakich, 2020). The SurveyUSA poll finding
similar first-choice results to the one commissioned for FairVote allows us to validate the
data set being used for this thesis as being reflective of popular opinion around the time.
Table 1: Demographic Summary Statistics of FairVote Survey Respondents
Demographic All Respondents LDPVs
Gender Male 1,380 (48.12%) Male 457 (47.90%)
Female 1,488 (51.88%) Female 497 (52.10%)
Race White 2,002 (69.80%) White 609 (63.84%)
Black 295 (10.29%) Black 153 (16.04%)
Hispanic 385 (13.42%) Hispanic 140 (14.68%)
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Asian 114 (3.97%) Asian 35 (3.67%)
Multiracial 27 (0.94%) Multiracial 11 (1.15%)
Other 45 (1.57%) Other 6 (0.63%)
Party
Affiliation
Republican 912 (31.80%) Republican 33 (3.46%)
Democrat 1,108 (38.63%) Democrat 777 (81.45%)
Independent 669 (23.33%) Independent 138 (14.47%)






Conservative 566 (19.74%) Conservative 86 (9.01%)
Moderate 1,016 (35.43%) Moderate 334 (35.01%)
Liberal 498 (17.36%) Liberal 316 (33.12%)
Very Liberal 229 (7.98%) Very Liberal 173 (18.13%)




Under $40k 1,100 (38.35%) Under $40k 321 (33.65%)
$40k-80k 1,063 (37.06%) $40k-80k 380 (39.83%)
Over $80k 705 (24.58%) Over $80k 253 (26.52%)
Education High School 763 (26.60%) High School 195 (20.44%)
Some College 1,092 (38.08%) Some College 344 (36.06%)
4-Year College
Degree





Table 2: Breakdown of Votes for Each Candidate in Each Preference Slot
Selection Pref. 1 Pref. 2 Pref. 3 Pref. 4 Pref. 5 Pref. 6 Pref. 7
Biden 191 204 163 91 57 28 27
Bloomberg 177 117 106 87 64 53 55
Buttigieg 89 102 114 128 109 74 34
Gabbard 16 20 20 23 46 61 112
Klobuchar 45 47 77 84 130 127 75
Sanders 291 187 118 56 46 30 32
Steyer 19 31 49 68 79 120 136
Warren 86 159 137 141 78 62 34
Undecided 40 47 83 106 69 54 50
Total Voters 954 914 867 784 678 609 555
Total Undecided Votes 914 867 784 678 609 555 505
Note: This table is counting from the original data. To simulate elections in later sections, I was able to fill





6.1 Voter ideology and utility of a candidate for a voter
We can consider the following model of voter preferences.
There are voters (i = 1, . . . , n) selecting among candidates (j = 1, . . . , p) in an election.
Ballots are structured in a way such that voters only have strict preferences among candidates
and they cannot indicate circular preferences, nor select one candidate more than once.
Individual preferences are determined based on a voter i’s utility for candidate j. Voter
i ranks candidates A, B, and C in the order A>B>C if
UiA > UiB > UiC .
Voters can choose to rank as many of the p candidates they choose. Ranks only reflect an
order of preference, rather than a magnitude of preference. We can assume that a voter
prefers any ranked candidate over any candidate whom he/she does not rank.





where Iix is the indicator for whether voter i has ideology x, and βjx is the quality of
candidate j for a voter with ideology x. The β vectors for each ideology group x contain
p entries, each corresponding to a “value” V of each candidate for a voter in that ideology
group. εij is a random component of utility, assumed to be independently and identically
distributed across candidates and voters. There are X ideology descriptors and I seek to
estimate that number of ideology β vectors using the multinomial logit model previously
used to model voter choice behavior (Dow and Endersby, 2004).
Other demographic characteristics would be considered by adding
∑
y∈Y
Diyαjy to the utility
function. Here, Diy is the indicator for whether voter i has demographic y, and αjy is the
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quality of candidate j for a voter with demographic y. That being said, given the limitations
in this data set (which are further explained in the following subsection), to consider the
impact of various demographic characteristics on voter preferences, we would instead amend
the previous equation to consider
∑
y∈Y
Diyαjy for demographic characteristics, rather than∑
x∈X
Iixβjx for voter ideology.
Each voter is a utility maximizer. The probability of voter i casting a ballot for candidate
1 is given by the following:
Pi1 = Pr[Ui1 > Ui2, Ui1 > Ui3, . . . , Ui1 > Uip].
For any m in the set of 1,. . ., p candidates,






Iixβmx), j 6= m],
where j is any candidate other than m and where ε is distributed type-I extreme value.
The probability that a voter i votes for candidate j, conditional upon him/her casting a












A voter i’s (who has the ideology x) utility for candidate j can also be considered as
Uij = Vjx + εij,
where Vjx is a numerical candidate “value” for any voter in ideology group x—contained
in the β vector for ideology x, solved for using the above maximum likelihood estimation
framework, inputting individual voter ranked preferences for various candidates—and where
εij is an error term that is i.i.d among candidates and voters. To determine the overall utility
of a candidate j for the population of voters, expressed as Uj, we can sum Vjx across each
25
6 EMPIRICAL MODEL 6.2 Data limitations as applied to the empirical model
voter and weight each voter according to demographic weights provided in the data.
6.2 Data limitations as applied to the empirical model
Much of previous literature working toward building a model of voter preferences has con-
sidered the role that various demographic characteristics, both of individual voters and of
different candidates, play in voter decisions to cast a ballot for a party or candidate, similar
to my theoretical model. For the purposes of this thesis, the following empirical model ex-
plores the role of ideology as the main determinant of preferences for candidates for a few
reasons. Primarily, the data is fairly limited in candidate preference variation among various
demographics, so it is difficult to consider the interplay of multiple demographics. Any one
variable can be considered on its own but cannot be considered along with another variable
(ex. a regression focusing solely on race or on ideological descriptor but not both). Having
to focus on only one variable, this model chooses to consider ideology, as it is often theo-
rized as being a main determinant of voter preferences in seminal location models of voting
(Downs, 1957). Additionally, an ideological descriptor might capture political leanings that
are caused by voters’ other identities, such as race or gender. Further, demographics compli-
cate voter preferences by introducing implicit biases, making it difficult to simply control for
demographics as being a factor in preference. For example, a white man with implicit biases
might require a male candidate of color or a female candidate to be closer to him ideologically
to provide him the same utility that a white male candidate would. This could be accounted
for using dummy variables for each of a voter’s demographic characteristics and interaction
terms among them; however, as previously stated, there is not enough variation in the data
to consider multiple variables in this way. Additionally, since demographic weights are pro-
vided in the data, they can be included in the regressions to account for variation in other
demographics among ideology groups. Finally, we are also limited by the data in the types
of information collected. FairVote only collected information about voter demographics and
ideology descriptors. We do not have information on each voter’s perception of candidate
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traits T or stances on key issues K, nor do we have clear metrics of candidate demographics
DC or candidate ideology IC .
Thus, this model helps evaluate the acquired survey data to two ends. Firstly, it assesses
how a voter’s ideology affects their utilities for various candidates. Spatial models of voter
preference often consider the distance between a voter’s ideology and that of each candidate;
though I might consider distance if there were clear ideology descriptors for each candidate,
this model allows us to evaluate the impact of voter ideology on candidate preferences more
generally. Additionally, the model enables us to estimate, for the given data set of ranked-
choice ballots, which candidate provides the most utility for the overall population of voters.
6.3 Evaluating different voting systems
I use the ranked-choice ballots in the obtained survey data to simulate outcomes of various
election systems. Each simulation outputs one single candidate (rather than an aggregate
ranking for the population) after votes are counted. Voting methods are differentiated by the
steps used to “count the votes” and, in practical application, by their ballot structures. The
null hypothesis is that each voting method simulated yields the same output. The alternative
hypothesis is that the voting methods yield more than one output across simulations.
In the event that the null hypothesis is rejected, the empirical model described above
can be used to evaluate the output of each voting system. For the selected candidate j from
each simulation, the overall utility for that candidate, Uj, corresponds to the social utility
of that candidate and of that voting system. Another test will be conducted where the
null hypothesis is that the multiple yielded candidates have indistinguishable overall utility.
That is to say, if candidates A, B, and C are selected as outputs, their overall utilities are
equal: UA = UB = UC . The alternative hypothesis is that the candidates have significantly
different overall utility. If this null hypothesis also rejected, the voting system (or systems)
that yield a candidate with the highest overall utility is determined to provide the highest




This section first presents both the results of the simulated election outcomes and of the logit
maximum likelihood estimation on the FairVote survey data. Then, I use a likelihood-ratio
test to test the hypotheses presented in the model and present simulations using new data,
randomized based on the MLE results, to validate the election outcomes. Additionally, I
consider other regressions to answer lingering questions about the estimation results.
7.1 Simulated election results
In the FairVote data, there were 954 voters determined to be LDPVs. For the purposes of
these simulated election outcomes, I counted these 954 voters’ ranked preferences as ballots,
and each ballot was weighted based on the voter’s assigned demographic weight to properly
reflect the population of concern, the U.S. Democratic primary electorate. The following
paragraphs explain how ranked-choice ballots are counted in each different system. In a
later section, I further explain why these systems were selected for consideration, as well as
their merits and drawbacks. Note that the simple plurality method is the only one that does
not require a ranked ballot to have been cast; thus, the remaining systems are considered to
be applications of ranked-choice voting.
Simple Plurality First-choice votes are counted for each candidate. The winner is the
candidate who receives the most first-choice votes.
Instant Runoff This is a two-stage election. In the first stage, first-choice votes are
counted for each candidate and the two candidates with the most first-choice votes proceed
to the second stage. Then, full-choice profiles of each voter are used to see which of these
two candidates each voter preferred; the most-preferred candidate after the second round is
determined to be the winner.
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Single-Elimination Runoff Since there are eight candidates to select from, there are
seven stages in this election. In the first round, first-choice votes are counted, and the
candidate who receives the fewest first-choice votes is eliminated. In the second round, full-
choice profiles are used to determine which of the remaining candidates is highest-ranked
in each voter’s ballot. This process continues as the candidate with the fewest votes is
eliminated each round and only the remaining candidates are considered on each voter’s
ballot. The winner is determined by who receives the most votes in the two-candidate
face-off in the final round.
Borda Count Points are awarded to each candidate based on where they fall in each
voter’s ranking. Since there are eight candidates, each voter’s first choice is given eight
points, their second choice is given seven points, and so on until their eighth and final choice
is given one point. Any unranked candidate receives zero points from that voter’s choice
profile. The winner is the candidate who has the most points once all ballots are counted.
In this data set, however, voters only had the option to rank seven candidates. Though
we could infer each voter’s eighth preference, we cannot assume that the voter would have
ranked the candidate over leaving the slot blank. Thus, no candidates are given only one
point from a ballot in the aforementioned method of counting. Therefore, I present an
additional, modified version of this system in the results where each voter’s first choice
is given seven points, their second is given six points, and so on until their seventh final
choice receives one point, while any unranked candidate receives zero points. This should
theoretically yield equivalent results to the first method of Borda count.
Simple Condorcet Condorcet elections consider all possible head-to-head scenarios be-
tween candidates; for these eight candidates, there are twenty-eight head-to-head face-offs.
Using a simple Condorcet method, the winner is the candidate who wins the most number
of head-to-head matchups.
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Marginal Condorcet (using win percentages) Slightly different from the previous
method, in each head-to-head matchup, we observe the percentage by which the victorious
candidate wins. For example, if the outcome is 65% of votes for Candidate A to 35% for
candidate B, the “win percentage” is 30%; candidate A has 30 added to their win percentage
tally from this matchup, and candidate B does not have any points added to their tally. Using
this marginal Condorcet method, the winner is the candidate who has the highest tally of
win percentages after all of the head-to-head matchups.
Marginal Condorcet (using total percentages) This method also considers the per-
centage of votes received by candidates in each Condorcet matchup; however, each candidate
receives a tally corresponding to the total vote percentage they received in each matchup.
For example, if the outcome is 65% of votes for Candidate A to 35% of votes for Candidate B,
candidate A has 65 added to their total percentage tally from this matchup, and candidate
B has 35 added to their tally.
Upon simulating the election outcomes using Python, Bernie Sanders was found to be the
winner for all election types. The outcomes of each election are presented in detail with their
procedure in Table 3. Since we do not see variation in the outputs of each voting method in
the different simulations, we fail to reject the first null hypothesis.
It is surprising that Sanders won every single election type, mostly considering that he
did not win the presidential primary in reality. That none of the election systems yielded a
different candidate than the others could suggest that the ballots from this sample are either
overwhelmingly in favor of Sanders or are highly polarized. I still proceed with the other
steps to see how the nature of the data led to these outcomes.
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Table 3: Simulated Election Outcomes Using All Likely Democratic Primary Voters
Election Type Procedure Winner
Simple Plurality Biden— 174 first-choice votes
Bloomberg— 173 first-choice votes
Buttigieg— 73 first-choice votes
Gabbard— 12 first-choice votes
Klobuchar— 34 first-choice votes
Sanders— 233 first-choice votes
Steyer— 16 first-choice votes
Warren— 69 first-choice votes
Undecided— 37 voters
Bernie Sanders








Round 1: Gabbard is eliminated
Round 2: Steyer is eliminated
Round 3: Klobuchar is eliminated
Round 4: Warren is eliminated
Round 5: Buttigieg is eliminated
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Simple Condorcet Biden— won 6 matchups
Bloomberg— won 5 matchups
Buttigieg— won 3 matchups
Gabbard— won 0 matchups
Klobuchar— won 2 matchups
Sanders— won 7 matchups
Steyer— won 1 matchup
Warren— won 4 matchups
Bernie Sanders
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Biden— won by 247.15 %
Bloomberg— won by 138.90 %
Buttigieg— won by 110.20 %
Gabbard— won by 0.00 %
Klobuchar— won by 57.62 %
Sanders— won by 259.95 %
Steyer— won by 28.57 %





Biden— had 427.62 % of votes
Bloomberg— had 344.90 % of votes
Buttigieg— had 295.67 % of votes
Gabbard— had 80.74 % of votes
Klobuchar— had 208.77 % of votes
Sanders— had 438.00 % of votes
Steyer— had 159.46 % of votes
Warren— had 335.80 % of votes
Bernie Sanders
7.1.1 Election results from bootstrapped samples
One might reconcile Sanders’ success in the previous simulations with his loss in the 2020
primaries by attributing the difference to his popularity with the electorate shifting after
the survey data was collected. To see how sensitive election outcomes are to changes in
preferences of the electorate, we can look at election results from bootstrapped samples. I
bootstrapped results to select 10,000 random samples of 500 voters (while accounting for
the probability of selecting each voter based on their demographic weights) on which to run
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each of the election types. The summarized results of these bootstrapped elections are seen
in Table 4.
We see more variation in the outcomes of these elections than the elections counting all
954 voters at once. In each ranked-choice election, Joe Biden won in 3.5% to 9.83% of the
samples while Bernie Sanders won those elections in the remainder of the samples. It is
interesting to note that, despite this trend in the ranked-choice elections, Sanders won all
10,000 simple plurality simulations. Of the 4,364 total elections that Biden won, all were
versions of ranked-choice elections, and, in each of these instances, the corresponding simple
plurality election for the sample elected Sanders instead. We should also note that, based
on the election win counts, no two systems are always electing the same candidate. Since
these bootstrapped results show more variation in election outcomes by yielding two different
candidates as winners, we can look to the empirical results to compare the social utilities
provided by Joe Biden and Bernie Sanders for the overall voting population.
Table 4: Numbers of Election Wins Per Candidate Using Bootstrapped FairVote Data
Election Type Biden Sanders
Simple Plurality 0 10,000
Instant Runoff 350 9,650
Single-Elimination Runoff 393 9,607
Borda Count 983 9,017
Borda Count (using 7→1 points) 657 9,343
Simple Condorcet 470 9,530
Marginal Condorcet (Win %age) 857 9,143
Marginal Condorcet (Total %age) 654 9,346
Note: Candidates other than Biden and Sanders were omitted from this table, as they did not win any of
the bootstrapped elections.
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7.2 Empirical results
Table 5, shows the results for the ideology β vectors from the maximum likelihood estimation
in the empirical model. Each row corresponds to the β vector for the ideology, and each
number in the row is considered to be the value of that candidate, Vj, for a voter with that
ideology. For example, the candidate value of Biden, VBiden, for a very conservative voter is
1.0435.
Using these β vectors, the total number of sampled voters that identify with each ideology,
and their demographic weights, I calculate the average overall utility of each candidate j for
this population of voters, expressed as Uj. These utilities are given in the “average” row
of Table 5. Figure 2 presents these β terms from Table 5 as a graph, where larger width
corresponds to higher utility of that candidate for that ideology group.
After assessing the utilities provided by each candidate to a member of each ideology
category and by weighing these individuals’ utilities by their demographic weights, we can
see an overall ranking of candidates for the voting population. Candidates are ranked as
such in the ideology estimation: Biden, Warren, Sanders, Buttigieg, Bloomberg, Klobuchar,
Steyer, Gabbard.
Surprisingly, Bernie Sanders, who won each simulated election using all ballots, is ranked
only third in this population ranking, with Joe Biden and Elizabeth Warren above him. It
would seem that if Biden provides the most utility for the voting population (when consider-
ing each candidate’s value for each voter’s ideology group), then he should be elected using
at least one of the simulated mechanisms. Before attempting to resolve this seeming discrep-
ancy, I confirm that the social utilities found in the empirical results are truly statistically
significant with a likelihood-ratio test.
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Figure 2: Candidates’ Quality, Vj, for Each Ideology Group and on Average
Note: Tulsi Gabbard is used as the benchmark candidate, since she had the lowest quality in each group of
voters.
7.2.1 Likelihood-ratio test
This likelihood-ratio test is evaluating which candidate, Biden or Sanders, provides the high-
est overall utility for the voting population of the eight candidates. I am testing only these
candidates because the simulated voting outcomes and the maximum likelihood estimation
yielded two different outcomes, with Biden leading in overall utility for the population and
Sanders winning all of the election simulations.
The overall parameter space is given by Θ and, in this instance, would be the true “highest
quality” candidate. I test the null hypothesis that the parameter θ is in a specified subset,
Θ0, of Θ. The alternative hypothesis is that the parameter θ exists in the complement of
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The test statistic for a likelihood-ratio test is given by
λLR = −2 ln
supθ∈Θ0 L(θ)
supθ∈Θ L(θ)
but can be rewritten to be expressed as a difference in log-likelihoods,
λLR = −2[`(θ0)− `(θ)] where `(θ) ≡ ln[sup
θ∈Θ
L(θ)]
For our purposes, the constrained parameter, θ, or the null hypothesis, is that Sanders
provides the most utility out of the slate of eight candidates. The unconstrained parameter,
θ0, or the alternative hypothesis, is that Biden provides the most utility out of the slate,
since he was the one deemed to have done so by the MLE results.
Since the test statistic λLR is multiplied by -2, it converges asymptotically to the χ
2-
distribution. I use two degrees of freedom in this calculation as there are two differences
in dimensionality between the parameters θ and θ0: in θ, USanders > UBiden and USanders >
UWarren, while the opposite hold in θ0. The critical value for the χ
2-distribution at the 95%
confidence level with df=2 is 5.991.
Using the previously estimated β parameters, the maximum log likelihood of the data
with the unconstrained parameter, θ0, is 5094.35 and the maximum log likelihood of the
data with the constrained parameter, θ, is 5101.33. The test statistic is, thus, estimated to
be λLR = −2[5094.35− 5101.33] = 13.96.
At the 95% confidence level, since the χ2 value of λLR = 13.96 is larger than the critical
value of 5.991, we reject the null hypothesis in this likelihood-ratio test and can reasonably
conclude that the constrained parameter, that Sanders provides the most utility out of the
slate of candidates, is not a good fit for the data.
We can consider the second set of hypotheses presented in the empirical model (whether
to reject or fail to reject the null hypothesis that multiple yielded candidates have indistin-
guishable overall utility) in the context of the outcomes of the bootstrapped simulations,
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which did yield multiple candidate outputs. Based on the likelihood-ratio test, we can now
reject this second null hypothesis and say that that the multiple yielded candidates, Joe
Biden and Bernie Sanders, do have distinguishable overall utility, and Joe Biden does pro-
vide the highest overall utility for the voting population. Recall that Biden was only elected
by ranked-choice mechanisms and, in every instance where he was elected, the corresponding
simple plurality simulation for the sample elected Sanders. As stated in the empirical model,
the overall utility of the candidate for the voting population also corresponds to the overall
utility of any election mechanism that elected that candidate. This means that any time that
the simple plurality outcome differed from the ranked-choice mechanisms, the ranked-choice
mechanism provided a higher utility for the voting population.
7.2.2 Simulating election outcomes using MNL estimates
Having confirmed the statistical significance of the the empirical results using a likelihood-
ratio test, I also validate the election simulation mechanisms I am using in this thesis. To
this end, I simulated random samples of 100 voters, with ideologies that are proportionally
representative of the overall population of Democratic primary voters. Each voter, based on
their ideology, has a randomly generated ranked-choice profile in alignment with the vote
probabilities determined by the ideology β vectors in Table 5. 100 voters were randomly
simulated ten times, and, with each new set of voters, the election types we have been
evaluating were simulated. The results of these simulated elections are shown in Table 6.
Note that each column corresponds to one set of randomly simulated voters, so any variation
among candidate outputs in each column is due only to a difference in election mechanism.
Of the 70 outcomes, Biden won 58 times, Warren won nine times, and Sanders won three
times; the number of candidate win outcomes follows the overall social utilities provided
by each candidate, shown in the “Average” row of Table 5. In the samples where different
mechanisms yield different candidates, at least one ranked-choice mechanism provides an
overall utility for the voting population that is equal to or higher than that of the simple
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plurality mechanism. Sample 5 elects Warren with simple plurality, but elects Biden with the
marginal Condorcet (by win percentage) mechanism. Sample 6 elects Biden not only with
the simple plurality mechanism, but also with the Borda count and marginal Condorcet (by
total percentage) mechanisms. Sample 10 elects Sanders with the simple plurality system,
but elects Biden or Warren using every ranked-choice mechanism.
Looking at the outcomes of different elections clarifies for us which mechanisms yield
different results from others using the same sample of voter ballots. Even though it might
appear, from this table, that the two runoff systems always yield the same result as simple
Condorcet and that Borda count and marginal Condorcet (by total percentage) always yield
the same result, these are not always the case, as we can see from the number of election win
counts in Table 4. Rather, I simply use these results to find confidence in the mechanisms I
use to simulate various election structures and to contribute to my evaluations of each voting
system in a later section.
Being confident in the election simulation mechanisms used and in the empirical results,
the question remains of why the simulated election outcomes which used the FairVote data
as an input all yielded the same candidate, Bernie Sanders, despite the finding that he did
not have the highest overall utility among the candidates for the population. This could
imply that the multinomial logit regression using ideology fails to accurately model these
voters’ preferences, so, in order to address these discrepancies in the results, I consider other
possible determinants of voter preferences, demographics, instead.
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7 RESULTS 7.2 Empirical results
7.2.3 Other demographics
In an attempt to address the discrepancy between the full simulated election outcomes and
the ideology estimations, it is helpful to consider demographics other than ideology. It
might be the case that Biden provides the highest utility for the voting population only
when considering candidates’ utilities for each ideology group. To see if candidates’ social
utility rankings changed when considering other demographics, I ran separate regressions
considering the following identifiers: race, gender, political party, income, and educational
attainment.
The effects of each demographic on utility for candidate are shown in Tables 7 through
11 and the candidates’ qualities, Vj, for each demographic group are depicted in Figures 4
through 8, where larger width corresponds to higher utility of that candidate for that ideology
group. Candidates’ average social utilities were ranked in the same order when considering
all of the other demographics—race, gender, party, income, and education—as they were in
the ideology estimations: Biden, Warren, Sanders, Buttigieg, Bloomberg, Klobuchar, Steyer,
Gabbard.
Still, none of the rankings deemed Sanders as providing the highest utility for the vot-
ing population. Perhaps it is the case that Sanders’ election success is explained by him
performing particularly well with a certain demographic group that is well-represented in
the electorate. To address this inquiry, we can note which groups he, and other candidates,
performed best with.
Sanders performed surprisingly well with conservative and moderate voters (though still
behind Biden in both groups), while Warren performed well with liberal (though behind
Biden) and very liberal voters. Sanders performed well with Black (though still behind
Biden) and Asian voters; Biden performed highest among Hispanic, Black, White, Multira-
cial, and Other voters. Biden performed best with both men and women, though men tended
to prefer Sanders in the second spot, while women tended to prefer Warren in the second
spot. Sanders was most preferred by Democrats (though behind Biden and Warren). Unsure
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voters favored Warren over other candidates, while Republican, Democrat, and Independent
voters preferred Biden the most. Biden led among all income groups; Sanders provided the
second highest utility for the group of voters making between $40k and $80k a year, while
Warren came in second for the other two income groups. Finally, Biden led among voters
whose maximum educational attainment was high school (with Warren close behind) and
those who completed some college (with Sanders close behind), while Warren led among
voters who obtained their four-year college degrees (with Biden close behind).
There are no identifiable demographic groups that Sanders performs well enough with to
explain his overwhelming success in the election simulations. When considering all candi-
dates, the MNL regressions yield that Biden provides the highest utility, regardless of which
demographic is considered as the main determinant of voter preferences. To explain the dis-
crepancy between these results and the simulated election outcomes where Sanders wins all
election types, we might consider the MNL outcomes when only considering two candidates:
Biden and Sanders. This can help us determine if Sanders is overwhelmingly preferred when
the slate of candidates is limited.
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7 RESULTS 7.2 Empirical results
Figure 3: Candidates’ Quality, Vj, for Each Racial Group and on Average
Note: Tulsi Gabbard is used as the benchmark candidate, since she had the lowest quality in each group of
voters.
Figure 4: Candidates’ Quality, Vj, for Each Racial Group and on Average, Not Including
“Other” Race
Note: Tulsi Gabbard is used as the benchmark candidate, since she had the lowest quality in each group of
voters.
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Figure 5: Candidates’ Quality, Vj, for Each Gender Group and on Average
Note: Tulsi Gabbard is used as the benchmark candidate, since she had the lowest quality in each group of
voters.
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Figure 6: Candidates’ Quality, Vj, for Each Party Group and on Average
Note: Tulsi Gabbard is used as the benchmark candidate, since she had the lowest quality in each group of
voters.
Figure 7: Candidates’ Quality, Vj, for Each Income Group and on Average
Note: Tulsi Gabbard is used as the benchmark candidate, since she had the lowest quality in each group of
voters.
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Figure 8: Candidates’ Quality, Vj, for Each Education Group and on Average
Note: Tulsi Gabbard is used as the benchmark candidate, since she had the lowest quality in each group of
voters.
7.2.4 Bernie or Joe?
We can look at an regression comparing Sanders to Biden to see how the two measure up
against each other. There were 873 voters of the 954 LDPVs who ranked either Bernie
Sanders or Joe Biden or both. If a voter ranked only one of the two, we can infer that the
ranked candidate is preferred to the other, thereby giving us a full ranking when considering
only those two candidates.
This data is used to determine β values for those two candidates. These values are -0.100
for Joe Biden and 0.000 for Bernie Sanders. This tells us that, in this voting population,
each person was 10% less likely to vote for Joe Biden over Bernie Sanders (in other words,
there is a 47.5% likelihood of voting for Biden and a 52.5% likelihood of voting for Bernie
Sanders). Given this information, we can better conceptualize that Bernie Sanders won
every simulated election outcome using the full data set; despite Biden providing the highest
social utility to voters, a majority of voters do prefer Sanders over Biden when the election
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is narrowed to the two of them.
Biden has the highest social utility of all candidates when the entire slate is included,
but Sanders is deemed to have the highest utility over Biden in the pairwise comparison;
this seems to violate the independence of irrelevant alternatives criterion at the aggregate
level because the presence of “irrelevant” candidates changes the relative order of Biden and
Sanders. This is perhaps because, in the empirical model used in this thesis, each ideology or
demographic group (ex. Very Liberal voters, Asian voters, etc.) was treated as an individual;
since each “individual” had multiple varying ballots attributed to them, IIA was violated
at the individual level and each group itself did not have consistent preferences. Though
the multinomial logit model violates IIA in this instance, IIA is a logical property rather
than a statistical one, and we can still be confident in the validity of the empirical results.
I further evaluate each voting system itself per the IIA criterion in the next section, but we
can remain confident in the yielded β values.
After looking at the various results, how might one explain the discrepancy between
the overall estimations and the Biden-Sanders estimation? Since Sanders had the highest
utility in the latter estimation, why was he not determined to provide the highest social
utility when all candidates were considered? The results could mirror some interpretations
of real life outcomes: Sanders had fervent primary support, but did not reach as broad a
coalition of voters as did Biden. Though the highest number of voters preferred Sanders—
both when other candidates were competing and when only he and Biden were competing—
Biden performed better within and across ideology and demographic groups. We can consider
the level of social utility each candidate has to be a measure of the breadth of their support.
It can be difficult for election mechanisms to take this into consideration, but, as seen in
the election simulations on bootstrapped data and on the data generated using the MLE
β values, ranked-choice mechanisms often select candidates with a wider appeal and higher
utility than do the simple plurality mechanisms.
To even better understand the unique nature of the FairVote data, I also consider, in the
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next section, features of each of the election mechanisms considered in this thesis, how they
might yield different outcomes, and how they might change voter incentives and strategies.
8 Evaluating Voting Systems
Given that Bernie Sanders was elected by every voting system when all voter ballots were
considered, I supplement our understanding of these systems by evaluating them on their
own merits, separate from evaluating their candidate output.
8.1 Criteria
To identify strengths and weaknesses of various voting methods, one should identify desirable
traits of a voting system. It is important to note that, ultimately, the satisfaction of these
criteria for each election system varies from theory to practical application in U.S. presidential
primary elections. This section discusses why each system was chosen for consideration,
the practical considerations of each mechanism’s use in the United States, and each one’s
adherence to the following criteria.
Fairness
Arrow (1950) identifies four fairness criteria to be applied to ordinal voting systems: un-
restricted domain, non-dictatorship, Pareto efficiency, and independence of irrelevant al-
ternatives. Unrestricted domain says that voting must account for all possible individual
preferences. Non-dictatorship means that the results of the election cannot reflect that of
any one person’s votes without consideration of other voters’ choices (i.e. the election out-
come should not be determined by one specific person’s vote). Pareto efficiency is a state
where no change can be made to the system’s outcome that would lead to improved utility
for one agent without decreasing some other agent’s utility; practically, this means that if
every voter prefers one candidate to another, the latter candidate should not fare better than
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the first in the election system outcomes. Finally, independence of irrelevant alternatives
means that, when considering an individual’s ranking for a subset of specific alternatives,
changes in that individual’s rankings of any “irrelevant” alternatives should not impact the
relative ranking of the “relevant” subset of options.
Low Level of Cannibalization
Cannibalization refers to when similar candidates pull votes from each other. This term
was used to discuss the trends among voters in the more radical wing of the Democratic
party, but cannibalization can theoretically happen to any similar candidates appealing to a
specific bloc of voters.
Consideration of All Votes Cast
In this democracy, anyone who has the right to vote and casts a ballot has the right to
have their ballot counted. However, in practice, sometimes ballots are effectively “wasted.”
There is disagreement on what constitutes a ballot being “wasted,” and some would argue
that contingent preferences need not be taken into account as long as each ballot is counted in
the first round of voting. This thesis, instead, assesses whether the election systems consider
each voter’s ballot in the event that their most-preferred candidate is not elected or that
their most-preferred candidate drops out of the race.
Low Subjectivity to Tactical Voting
I assess how sensitive each election type is to “strategic” voting. There are different methods
that fall under the umbrella of tactical voting, and the definition of tactical voting varies
across literature. For the purposes of this thesis, I define tactical voting as when voters
can use methods to deliberately misrepresent their preferences in order to push forward
their most desired outcome. I also address how different voting systems impact a voter’s
incentives for truthful revelation or, conversely, to prioritize a “useful” vote when ranking
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their preferences, even if this misrepresentation does not ultimately push forward their most
desired outcome.
8.2 Voting systems
Unrestricted Domain: Before assessing what differs among the various election systems, we
must note that all of the elections are operating under an unrestricted domain. Some people
would disagree, categorizing political preferences as being restricted because they are single-
peaked. This suggests that if we can rank candidates on an ideological spectrum in the
party and if we know a voter’s ideology, then we can determine that voter’s ranking of all
candidates, as in the traditional one-dimensional spatial model. However, there exist no
commonly agreed-upon locations of each candidate on the political spectrum. Additionally,
there are identifiable rankings in the data set that would suggest that preferences are not
single-peaked. For example, there were 91 LDPVs who ranked both Michael Bloomberg
and Bernie Sanders in their top two spots, and all but two of these voters ranked more
preferences than those two candidates. These two candidates are commonly considered to
be on opposite ends of the party’s political spectrum, so we can consider these 89 voters to
be concrete examples of voter preferences not being single-peaked and of the domain not
being restricted.
Non-Dictatorship: Additionally, all elections considered in this thesis are also non-
dictatorial in that their outcomes do not reflect the votes of one specific person. Though
plurality elections can be, in some instances, decided by one-vote, this is merely a close
election rather than a dictatorial one as just over half the voters cast the deciding vote,
rather than just one person who knows they have that control. In this thesis, all considered
elections are non-dictatorial in that if there are two candidates and every voter except one
selects candidate B while one person selects candidate A, candidate B still wins.
Pareto Efficiency : Furthermore, all elections being considered in this thesis are Pareto
efficient; based on the information provided in ballots, once the winning candidate is selected,
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the winner cannot be changed without making at least one other voter worse off. It is
important, however, to note that if plurality elections are occurring without voters’ truly
revealed first-preferences, we cannot know if there are possible Pareto improvements. The
same can be said of ranked-choice elections if people do misrepresent their preferences, but
there are fewer incentives for voters to do so, and these ballots collect more information
about the range of voter preferences with which systems can determine a Pareto efficient
outcome. Pairwise votes are shown in Table 12, and we can see that none of the pairwise
matchups have all voters preferring one candidate over the other. Since no candidates are
universally preferred over any other, any outcome reached by the election systems is Pareto
efficient.
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives : We can look to the full FairVote elections to
see if there are any instances where IIA is violated in the empirical data. Since Bernie
Sanders won each election type, we would assume that a violation of IIA would occur if
some “moderate” spoiler candidates were removed from the election to divert more votes
toward Joe Biden. Removing votes for only Michael Bloomberg and reallocating his voters’
preferences in the simple plurality election did not swing the election in favor of Joe Biden.
However, considering an election only between Joe Biden, Bernie Sanders, and Elizabeth
Warren did swing the simple plurality election (still accounting for demographic weights) in
favor of Joe Biden, where Biden received 323 votes, Sanders receives 321 votes, and Warren
received 125 votes. Sanders still wins all of the ranked-choice elections. Seeing this trend
might also explain why Sanders lost to Biden in the actual primary despite performing
so well in this data set and in polling from around the same time. It could be that voters
preemptively narrowed the election not just to Biden and Sanders but also to Warren, and she
acted as a “spoiler” candidate in the election since her voters’ ballots could not be reallocated
as they could have been in a ranked-choice election. Though we do not see any IIA violations
in the ranked-choice elections from this data set, the ranked-choice mechanisms considered
in this thesis are still susceptible to them in other situations; therefore, I still evaluate each
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system’s adherence to the IIA criteria in the following subsections.
The first three previously discussed criteria—unrestricted domain, non-dictatorship, and
Pareto efficiency—apply in the same ways to all voting systems considered. The remaining
criteria, however,—independence of irrelevant alternatives, cannibalization levels, consider-
ation of all votes cast, and subjectivity to tactical voting—differ between systems, so are
considered separately for each election mechanism as follows.
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8.2.1 Majoritarian
Simple Plurality U.S. Democratic presidential primaries are majoritarian in that, after
voters cast their ballots to pledge delegates to certain candidates, delegates must reach a
majority at the national convention for a nominee to be selected. However, if no candidate
reaches a majority from primary elections, it is up to the delegates, rather than voters,
how to reallocate votes to yield a majority. Because I do not want to assume delegate
actions, I instead simulated simple plurality elections to contrast with the ranked-choice
voting systems. Additionally, when three or more candidates are competing in an election,
the election is a plurality one rather than a majoritarian one unless there are subsequent
rounds (or circumstances like how delegates can reallocate votes) or ranked-choice voting is
used; this is the reality for many elections in the United States and plurality elections are
widely used in this country.
Acknowledging that the simple plurality mechanism is meant to contrast with the ranked-
choice elections, and since I contend that single-choice elections can be susceptible to tactical
voting (as is later explained), I could have instead simulated this election by considering each
voter’s strategic preference among the two most “likely” candidates, Biden and Sanders. If
I had done this, we would still see Sanders winning, but this was not the mechanism I
used because we cannot assume that every single voter will feel pressured in a single-choice
system to vote strategically among two candidates. This is why I counted plurality totals
using only the first-choice preferences of each voter as provided in the ranked-choice ballot.
When evaluating the merits of the simple plurality system, however, I consider elections
where voters can indicate only a single candidate preference rather than being able to rank
a full choice profile.
When an election system only has to consider one preference of voters, this is the least
time-consuming of the possible systems for vote tabulators and county voting precincts. A
simple plurality system for counting votes can, however, be used even if voters do indicate
their ranked preferences on the ballot, but this would take more time at the polls or when
60
8 EVALUATING VOTING SYSTEMS 8.2 Voting systems
filling out an absentee ballot while not reaping the benefits of collecting the additional
information on voter preferences. Simple plurality elections are also the most transparent of
the election systems and are easiest for the electorate to follow along with vote counts.
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives : Simple plurality elections violate the indepen-
dence of irrelevant alternatives condition. Suppose there are three candidates A, B, and C
and seven voters; three voters have the preferences A>B>C, two voters have the preferences
B>A>C, and two voters have the preferences C>B>A. In a plurality election between only
candidates A and B, candidate A receives three votes and B receives four; thus, candidate
B is the winner. However, once candidate C is introduced, candidate A receives three votes,
candidate B receives two votes, and candidate C receives two votes; thus, candidate A is the
winner. Since the winner of the election changes to another “relevant” candidate with the
introduction of an irrelevant alternative, plurality elections violate the IIA property. This is
a similar example to what we witnessed in the FairVote data set, where the introduction of
Warren changed the relative ordering of Biden and Sanders.
Cannibalization: Let’s modify the example above. Suppose that, now, there are two
additional voters have the preferences C>B>A. Despite the fact that a sum of five voters
prefer either candidate A or candidate B to candidate C, candidate C wins the plurality
election with four votes, while A and B receive three and two votes each, respectively. In
simple plurality elections, there is a significant possibility that candidates who are similar
(in this example, we could consider A and B to be these similar candidates) will cannibalize
support for the other, dependent, of course, on the other candidates competing in the election.
If a voter ideologically aligns with two or more candidates, but they need to cast a single
preference, they can at most select only one of these options in a simple plurality elections,
thereby pulling support from the others. Note that this is also similar to the IIA violation
we witnessed in the FairVote data; Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warren, who are widely
considered to be similar candidates, seem to have cannibalized each other in swinging the
election toward Joe Biden.
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Consideration of All Votes : Simple plurality elections are also weak in that, in application
in U.S. presidential primaries, early voting and staggered elections can lead to many wasted
votes. Early voting for a state’s election can occur up to a month before the state’s primary
Election Day, and several other states can hold primaries within that time. If a candidate
notices that their performance has been low and decides to drop out of a race before other
states’ primary elections, voters who have already cast early votes for those candidates do
not have a chance to reconsider or reallocate their votes. Early voters, registered voters who
did attempt to participate in the election, are no longer having their votes “count” in the
ultimate selection, despite likely being part of a strong voting bloc having chosen to vote
early.
Subjectivity to Tactical Voting : The significant differences between a majoritarian/plurality
system and ranked-choice election systems lie not so much in the method used to count votes,
but in the incentive structures for voters to represent their true first-choice. There is an in-
centive to misrepresent preferences in simple plurality elections (i.e. assessing which two
of the slate of candidates is strongest and indicating one’s preference from only those two
choices). For example, if a voter strongly likes candidate A and strongly dislikes candidate
C, but views the election as a true competition between candidates B and C, they will cast
their one ballot for candidate B rather than “wasting” their vote on candidate A. While
this is a clearly misrepresented preference, this does not count as tactical voting under my
previously-established definition because there is no way that a voter can misrepresent their
preference to increase the likelihood of their true preference, or most-preferred candidate,
winning. In this example, the voter choosing to vote for candidate B does not increase the
likelihood of candidate A winning (it, in reality, decreases the likelihood of this). The only
way to increase the likelihood of candidate A winning is to vote for candidate A, which would
just be a truthful revelation of their preferences. Strategically voting for candidates who will
perform well in the general, though considered by many to be an example of tactical voting,
is considered in my model as simply one factor that might affect voter’s preferences. How-
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ever, voters should not forced into making this choice, as they often are in simple plurality
elections.
8.2.2 Ranked-choice
Overall When voters are asked to submit ranked-choice preferences, it can cause lengthy
ballots, potentially increasing production costs. It might also be more time-consuming for
county precincts and vote tabulators to count votes; however, computer technology can help
make this faster. Additionally, use of a ranked-choice system that does not merely count
first-preference votes can be viewed as less transparent, since it is not as simple for citizens
to follow the math behind vote tabulations. However, in applicable situations, having voters
rank their choices in one ballot prevents the massive costs of holding separate runoff election
timelines with lower participation rates—up to a million dollars just in some metropolitan
counties (“7 Georgia Counties”, 2020)—where voters must come back to the polls or submit
new absentee ballots to express preference for one candidate.
In all ranked-choice ballots, voters do not have as large an incentive to misrepresent
their preferences as is present when they can only choose one candidate. Especially in
later primaries, voters often feel as though the competition has come down to two most
likely candidates; thus, they only choose to cast their vote for one of those two. In ranked-
choice ballots, however, voters can account for this by indicating their true preferences while
ensuring to rank either one or both of these two “most likely” candidates somewhere in their
ballots to participate if the election does come down to them. Relatedly, we see that there
should be theoretically less cannibalization, as is discussed further. I evaluate the individual
ranked-choice election types for the desired criteria—independence of irrelevant alternatives,
low cannibalization levels, consideration of all votes cast, and low subjectivity to tactical
voting—by grouping them into runoff, Borda count, and Condorcet mechanisms.
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Runoff Mechanisms This category includes instant runoff and single-elimination runoff
mechanisms. Instant-runoff voting (IRV) was included in this thesis for consideration because
it is an often implemented RCV method in the United States, especially as many elections
that use RCV only have at most three legitimate/feasible candidates. When there are only
three candidates, a two-stage IRV method is all that is needed. This is also the system
most comparable to multi-stage runoffs, such as what we recently saw in the 2020 Georgia
elections for U.S. Senate. David Perdue and Jon Ossoff went to a runoff election in January
2021 after winning the two highest vote totals in the first round in November 2020. In this
real-world example, Perdue would have won if the election merely ended with the plurality
winner after the first round; however, after inviting voters to cast new ballots, Ossoff was
declared winner after the second round. IRV explores how RCV can account for situations
like this in one step, rather than having to host two elections. Single-elimination runoff was
included as I predicted it might yield different results from IRV in some instances when
more than three candidates are present and because it is the election system that the state
of Maine uses for its ranked-choice ballots.
Consideration of All Votes : We noticed interesting results concerning if there were any
differences in outcome between IRV and single-elimination, given that more than three can-
didates are options in the FairVote data set. If the two candidates in the last round of the
single-elimination runoff are the same as the two candidates in the second/final round of in-
stant runoff, then the vote counts in that last round are the same regardless of which system
is used, and the winner remains the same. However, there were instances in the bootstrapped
elections that the two yielded different outcomes (these elections are summarized in Table 4
and we can see that the number of wins per candidate do not equal each other for these two
election types). Different candidates are elected by the two mechanisms only when there are
different candidates in the second IRV round from the last single-elimination round; there
are also times that the last round candidates differ between election types even when the two
yield the same winner. We often saw this occur when Bernie Sanders and Michael Bloomberg
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proceeded to the second round of IRV but Bernie Sanders and Joe Biden made it to the final
round of single-elimination. This suggests that Joe Biden had the third-most amount of
people who preferred him first, but when votes could be reallocated, he and Sanders came
out above Bloomberg, who had more people first-preferring him but fewer people preferring
him as an alternate choice. For reasons such as these, when people are able to reallocate
their votes even if their first-preferred candidate is no longer being considered, the runoff
systems meet the “consideration of all votes” criterion. There are also no “wasted” votes
because, even if a candidate drops out of the election after votes have already been cast, the
tabulators can simply consider each voter’s next-preferred choice.
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives : Let’s look back at the example considered where
I determined that simple plurality elections violate Arrow’s IIA condition, where there are
three voters preferring A>B>C, two voters preferring B>A>C, and two voters preferring
C>B>A. The plurality election considering only candidates A and B yielded B as the winner;
however, once candidate C was introduced, A was deemed the winner. Runoff elections
correct the IIA violation for this example, yielding B as the winner when all three candidates
are participating (three votes for A, two for B, and two for C →B is deemed more popular
than C, so C is eliminated →B wins against A in the final round) and when only A and B
are participating (four votes for B and three for A).
However, this does not mean that runoff elections always meet the IIA criterion. Consider
the following voter preferences: four voters prefer C>A>B, three voters prefer B>C>A, and
two voters prefer A>B>C. In an election involving candidates A and B, A receives six votes
and B receives three votes, making A the winner. When candidate C joins the race, C receives
four votes, B receives three votes, and A receives two votes. When B and C go to a runoff,
C receives four votes while B receives five, making B the runoff election winner. Since the
introduction of candidate C in the race made B the winner when A would have otherwise
won, IIA is violated. This example shows the impact of a popular but perhaps divisive
candidate entering the race, diverting favor from well-liked but non-exciting candidates.
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This IIA violation could also be an instance of cannibalization in the event that candidates
A and C are similar.
Cannibalization: To further assess how runoff elections impact cannibalization, let’s con-
sider the second example discussed when assessing plurality voting, where the population had
the following candidate preferences: three voters prefer A>B>C, two voters prefer B>A>C,
and four voters prefer C>B>A. In the simple plurality election, candidate C wins because
candidates A and B are cannibalizing each other. In either of the runoffs, the second and
final round would be a runoff between candidates A and C, which would result in five votes
for A and four votes for C, making A the winner. Here, we see that ranked-choice voting was
able to correct for the cannibalization of similar candidates. Many hope that runoffs would
correct for cannibalization in many such situations, and, while runoff elections can prevent
IIA violations and cannibalization in many instances, neither are completely avoided.
Subjectivity to Tactical Voting : It is thought that tactical voting can be prevalent in
runoff elections where there are multiple rounds of voting (i.e. deliberately voting for a weak
candidate in the first round to set your truly preferred candidate up for success in the second
round, or compromising in the first round to make sure you have a desirable candidate in
the second round). However, this instance of tactical voting can be largely prevented by
requiring voters to submit a ballot where they rank all their preferences at once. For this
reason, IRV, and even more so single-elimination, is thought to be highly resistant to tactical
voting (Bartholdi and Orlin, 1991). In ranked-choice runoff elections, voters express their
preferences for candidates for every contingency of candidate matchups that might occur in
later rounds, preventing compromising. This also prevents deliberately misrepresenting in
the first round because voters must express preferences the same way for all rounds of voting,
as they are only able to submit one ballot for the entire election. Since voters’ rankings for
each candidate are only considered if their more-highly-preferred candidates are no longer
being considered, voters have incentives to rank all of the candidates competing in runoff
elections, including ones they dislike or are indifferent to, simply to participate in the election
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in every contingency.
Borda Count Mechanisms Borda count has been posited as a potential voting system
because it attempts to take into consideration the nuanced degrees of preference voters have
for each candidate from the very first round, rather than only if necessary. Approval voting,
where voters simply mark yes on any candidate of whom they would approve, is an instance
of Borda count. Approval voting was not considered in this thesis as it is deemed to be easily
manipulable, but Borda count is a more nuanced way to give candidates some “credit” for
being placed somewhere in a voter’s choice profile.
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives : Borda count elections are often criticized for
not meeting the IIA criterion. Assume there are three candidates A, B, and C. Voters have
the following preferences: two voters prefer A>C>B and three voters prefer B>A>C. When
only candidates A and B are competing, we use a 2-1 scoring system, and A receives 7 points
while B receives 8 points, meaning B wins. When all three candidates are competing, we
use a 3-2-1 scoring system. In this event, A receives 12 points, B receives 11 points, and
C receives 7 points, meaning A wins. The introduction of candidate C made A the winner
when B would have otherwise won, so IIA is violated. We often discuss IIA in the context of
cannibalization. Here, it does not seem that candidate C is cannibalizing candidate B but,
rather, that the Borda count mechanism is highlighting that candidate A is preferred over
candidate C by every voter.
Cannibalization: Borda count does help to account for cannibalization of votes since
candidates who are similar to each other, as long as they are ranked close to each other,
receive a similar amount of points from each voter. Though the slight point differentials
might impact which one of them wins, Borda count voters can still express preferences for
any number of similar candidates over any other candidates that they strongly do not prefer.
Consideration of All Votes : Because the winner of a Borda count election is determined
at one step, all ballots cast should are counted and there are no “wasted” votes. If, after a
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voter casts a ranked ballot in a Borda count election, a candidate drops out mid-election,
the negative impacts that would be present in a single-choice election are mitigated since
voters did still rank multiple candidates and allocate points to them.
Subjectivity to Tactical Voting : There are tactical voting concerns that arise with Borda
count. Since unranked candidates receive zero points, even a ballot that does not allow for
repeated or cyclical preferences can enable misrepresentation that benefits a voter’s true
first-preference. Assume candidates A, B, C, D, and E are competing, and there is a voter
who would approve of any of them in the order E>B>C>D>A. While their true preferences
would be expressed by ranking the candidates in that order, they have a tactical incentive
to only rank candidate E in slot one and not rank any of the rest of the candidates, thereby
awarding candidate E five points, while the rest receive zero. This occurs so long as voters
are aware of how the ranked choices will be counted, especially since voters should not be
required to rank full choice profiles if they do not want to, but it is a matter of democratic
transparency that voters should have this information.
Additional Concerns : The previous criteria were evaluated using theoretical examples,
but there are also some additional problems with Borda count that we can visualize in
the FairVote data set. As was standard for the simulations in this thesis, voters ranked
preferences one through seven; candidates received eight points per first-preference, seven-
points for second-preference, and so on until receiving two points for seventh-preference.
Realizing that I should not infer that a voter who chose all seven preferences would necessarily
have ranked the one remaining candidate as eighth-preference if given the option to, I decided
to see what would happen if I shifted the points over by one. Then, when candidates received
seven points per first-preference, six points for second-preference, and so on until receiving
one point for seventh-preference, we notice changes in the differences in points between
candidates. As seen in Table 3, the point differential between Bernie Sanders and Joe Biden
changes, from 78 to 86, denoting a 10% increase, dependent on the point totals being used.
While we might have anticipated that the two different methods of allocating points would
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yield the same results (as they did in this instance), the magnitude of the win changed as
Biden lost more points after shifting the scale than did Sanders. This suggests that Biden
was receiving more points from being higher up in voters’ rankings, rather than from simply
being included in the ballots, than was the case for Sanders. We also see that the two Borda
count mechanisms elected different candidates at times from the bootstrapped elections in
Table 4 and the simulations using the β vectors in Table 6. It is a weakness of the Borda
count method that something so arbitrary as the number of points allocated to each rank
could have consequential effects on closer races. The point allocation and Borda count as a
whole are weak to the criticism that assigning points to candidates based on how they were
ranked by voters assumes magnitudes of difference in preferences that voters never explicitly
stated.
Condorcet Mechanisms Simple Condorcet was selected for consideration because, in
considering each possible two-candidate matchup from the slate of candidates, it acknowl-
edges candidates who have appeal over all other candidates. Considering the number of
head-to-head matchups that candidates win, however, ignores the margins by which they
win and also always yielded 7-6-5-4-3-2-1-0 outcomes in the simulations. So, I also con-
sidered a marginal Condorcet method that adds up candidates’ win percentages. Finally,
realizing that even this might not provide a perfect picture, since matchups can have the
same win percentage even if they do not have the same amount of voters participating, I also
decided to add a marginal Condorcet method adding up total percentages of votes received
per candidate.
It was very interesting to note, as seen in Table 6 that, the marginal Condorcet method
with total percentages yielded a different outcome than the other two Condorcet methods
in two elections. We also notice a different in win counts per candidate from these various
Condorcet types in Table 4. We can possibly attribute these differences in outcome to the
participation in vote ballots. For example, the Steyer-Gabbard matchups had fewer voters
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participating because they are not frequently ranked candidates, while the Biden-Sanders
matchups have more voters because they are both frequently ranked candidates. Since the
marginal Condorcet method by total percentage accounted for these differences in matchups,
we see that it sometimes yields a different outcome. In elections with enforced ranking, where
voters would have to rank all competing candidates, we should not see differences in these
numbers; however, if voters should be able to rank only the candidates they want to, then
we should expect to see some differences in outcome between these systems.
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives : Adherence to the desired IIA criterion varies
between the different Condorcet types. IIA does hold when using the simple Condorcet
method. By nature, simple Condorcet considers pairwise elections; therefore, when a new
candidate is introduced, they do not affect the existing matchups. The introduction of a new
candidate only changes the winner of the election if they, themselves, are the new winner.
However, IIA is violated in certain occasions with both marginal Condorcet elections. Let’s
consider a scenario where there are candidates A and B, and 51 voters prefer A>B while 49
voters prefer B>A. Candidate A wins simple Condorcet (having one pairwise win while B has
zero), marginal Condorcet by win percentage (having a win percentage tally of 2% while B
has 0%), and marginal Condorcet by total percentage (having a total percentage tally of 51%
while B has 49%). Now, suppose that when candidate C is added, 51 voters prefer A>B>C
and 49 prefer B>C>A. The A-B matchup has 51% of voters preferring A and 49% preferring
B; the A-C matchup has 51% preferring A and 49% preferring C; and the B-C matchup has
100% preferring B and 0% preferring C. Candidate A remains the simple Condorcet winner,
since A has two pairwise wins while B and C have zero each. However, now, candidate B
wins both the marginal Condorcet by win percentage (percentage tallies are 4% for A, 100%
for B, and 0% for C) and marginal Condorcet by total percentage (percentage tallies are
102% for A, 149% for B, and 49% for C). Therefore, IIA is violated in this instance for both
marginal Condorcet methods.
Cannibalization & Consideration of All Votes : Similar to the other RCV systems, there is
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a slimmer likelihood for cannibalization in the Condorcet methods than in a plurality system.
Voters can indicate that they prefer any number of similar candidates over other types of
candidates without a problem. Additionally, by nature of the Condorcet voting systems
considering all ballots in their entirety in a single round of ballot counting, all ballots cast
are counted. If, after a voter casts a ranked ballot in a Condorcet election, a candidate drops
out mid-election, the Condorcet ballots can still be counted while simply ignoring matchups
that included that candidate.
Subjectivity to Tactical Voting : Since Condorcet elections consider head-to-head matchups,
all voters have an incentive to rank every single candidate to have their opinions heard in all
of the matchups. They do not have a tactical incentive to only rank one or a few candidates
unless they are completely indifferent between any candidates who they leave unranked.
Voters also have the incentive to rank all candidates if there is a candidate they partic-
ularly dislike, making sure to rank them in last or near-last place. Voters can, however,
tactically misrepresent their preferences to set their preferred candidates up for more suc-
cess. For example, if a voter prefers candidates in the order A>B>C>D>E but thinks that
the competition will come down to being between candidates A and B, they can rank their
preferences as A>C>D>E>B to try and set candidate B up for failure in all of their head-
to-head matchups because this would benefit candidate A in all Condorcet types. Notice
that this scenario reflects the aforementioned example showing an IIA violation: voters in
marginal Condorcet elections can tactically rank less relevant candidates (candidate C in
that example) higher than their preferred candidate’s strongest competition (candidate A)
to benefit their most preferred candidate (candidate B).
9 Discussion
Before discussing the implications of the previous two sections on presidential primaries, it
is important to note some limitations. The empirical results are limited in that we cannot
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assume that the “first-choice” preferences that were indicated in the RCV ballots would have
been the same as voters’ single-choices if they were each only allowed to select one candidate.
The difference in incentive structures created for voters by single-choice and ranked-choice
ballots were discussed in length in the previous section, and using simple plurality as a
proxy for a single-choice election is inherently flawed for these reasons. Additionally, though
the survey data seemed to reflect popular polling at the time of collection, and though
Bernie Sanders won every election simulated from votes in the data set, Joe Biden swept
the remainder of the primary races and clinched a victory. There remain unknown reasons
(perhaps further differences in incentive structures or a notion similar to that of “spoiler”
candidates mentioned in the previous section) that surveys and polling around this time did
not predict or reflect the eventual winner of the 2020 U.S. Democratic presidential primary
election.
Looking at traits of various election systems, some fare better than others when con-
sidering certain criteria. All election systems met Arrow’s criteria of unrestricted domain,
non-dictatorship, and Pareto efficiency. The only system which was found to not violate
the IIA principle was simple Condorcet. Though the simple plurality election is easiest and
least costly to implement in the United States, it suffers by “wasting” votes, by leading to
cannibalization of similar candidates, and by creating incentives for voters to misrepresent
their preferences. All of the ranked-choice elections considered help to limit “wasted” votes
and cannibalization and help reduce incentives for voters to misrepresent their preferences.
However, Borda count and Condorcet elections can yield variable results based on the exact
system used and they are more subject to tactical voting, whereas simple plurality and the
runoff elections are not as susceptible to strategic voting. Joe Biden was deemed by my es-
timations to provide the highest social utility for the voting population and, though he was
elected in real life by a system we’ve simplified to consider as a plurality one, this thesis has
exposed weaknesses of simple plurality systems and has shown how sensitive voting systems
can be to changes in voter preferences and incentives.
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The two runoff systems—instant runoff and single-elimination runoff—though imperfect,
provide many benefits compared to a simple plurality or majority election considering only
single-choice ballots. Additionally, asking voters to cast ranked-choice preferences in regular
elections would elicit benefits in participation and truthful revelation. Areas in the United
States that have implemented RCV have seen success and popular support for its continued
implementation (“Data on Ranked Choice Voting”, 2020). Even if results were to suggest
that neither of these runoff systems would yield different candidate outcomes than single-
choice elections, collecting ranked-choice ballots would still provide ample additional data
with which to further study voter preferences than currently exists. However, per my empir-
ical results, ranked-choice outcomes that did differ from plurality outcomes always provided
equal or higher social utility to the voting population than did the simple plurality result.
Assessing the impact of RCV on primary elections is notable and unique from impacts
on other elections for two reasons. Firstly, it is increasingly common to see large slates
of candidates in presidential primaries, and RCV is only triggered or consequential when
there are more than three candidates competing. RCV has rarely been studied with well
over four candidates (and rarely outside of general elections), and, as primary elections will
surely continue to invite many candidates to compete, primaries provide unique territory in
which to study the impact of ranked ballots on such large fields. Secondly, since candidates
in presidential primaries are, by nature, all members of the same party, there are not two
automatic front runners leading the race. In general elections, contests can easily be narrowed
to two established, party-backed candidates. By contrast, presidential primary elections can
be unpredictable in outcome, dependent only on voter mobilization and eager participation.
Since voter preferences are less likely to be clustered around two candidates in primaries than
they are in general elections, collecting ranked-choice data and surveys on future primaries
would be uniquely informative.
As it currently stands in presidential primaries, nominee selection is warped for many
reasons. Election timings highly complicate voter preferences and create anxiety on how
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to allocate limited votes. Delegates wield immense power since any brokered convention is
left to their sole discretion and no longer to that of voters. It is likely that these delegate
structures are a matter of agenda control by parties to elect their preferred candidates
(Levine & Plott, 1977), under the notion that the party’s preferred candidates will appeal
to the overall electorate. That being said, it is understandable that the party establishment
would hope to select a candidate who appeals to a majority of the voting base in order to
form a strong coalition going into the general election; however, there is a way to gather
information about how candidates truly appeal to the party base, rather than merely having
delegates change their votes based on their preferences. Ranked-choice ballots would provide
parties with more information than they are currently gathering, and parties can use these
ballots to build broad, majority coalitions of voters rather than of delegates. Ranked-choice
ballots, by informing parties about voters’ true preferences, better inform everyone about
how voters are ideologically dispersed throughout the voting population and help parties
better understand their voters to help future candidate and party elections. Ranked-choice
ballots also open the door to future research on how RCV can make some candidates more
viable and perhaps impact their decisions on whether to remain in/drop out of elections
or on where and how to strategically campaign. Ranked-choice ballots and voting systems
are far better prepared to handle large slates of candidates than are our current systems.
Furthermore, they are prepared to foster competition, ever important since parties that
embrace fair, tough competition in their primary elections can set themselves up for more
success in general and future elections.
10 Conclusion
This thesis addressed the question: do various election systems, both single- and ranked-
choice, differ in their social welfare for a voting population, in their effects on voting proce-
dure, or in their practical applications?
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By building upon a theoretical model considering the role of demographics and ideology
on voter preferences and by applying a multinomial logit model of voter choice from previous
literature in economics and political science, this thesis determined a unique way to assess
the favorability of various election systems in alignment with overall social welfare. The
MLE results determining social utility of each candidate for the voting population also
informed us about candidate preference trends among various ideology and demographic
groups. Though the initial simulated election results using the ballots of LDPVs from the
FairVote survey data did not show variation in candidates elected, we did see more variation
in election system results by bootstrapping the data and when simulating voter ballots using
the MLE results themselves. Observing that Bernie Sanders was overwhelmingly favored
by most election mechanisms while Joe Biden was favored on average by most ideology and
demographic groups helped elucidate the complexity and strength of voter preferences in
an election with such fierce competition. When considering voter preferences for Biden vs.
Sanders when only these two candidates were preferred, Sanders was considerably favored
over Biden, helping to clarify Sanders’ strength in the full election simulations.
Ultimately, the results were used to evaluate the single-choice plurality election method
against all of the various ranked-choice election methods, assessing Arrow’s fairness criteria,
incentive structures, subjectivity to tactical voting, and practical application. If applied to
U.S. presidential primary elections, ranked-choice systems would offer a potential remedy
to the challenges voters face in navigating timing their ballots and would provide delegates
with more information to cast representative ballots at national conventions.
There is also a potential for future research in considering the impacts of ranked-choice
voting on candidate strategy, as changes in election mechanisms might affect the existing de-
sires candidates have to distinguish themselves from their competition and to signal strength
in early primaries. Information, such as that gathered from the empirical results, on how
demographics and ideological characteristics impact voter preferences, could also be helpful
for candidates looking to strategically campaign to voters in certain demographics, regional
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locations, or other affiliation groups needed to win the nomination. To this end, more data
with larger sample sizes can be collected on ranked-choice voting, both from surveys and
from implementation in elections. Further information, especially from elections with numer-
ous competing candidates, would enable future models of voter preference and would teach
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